

## **Conference Program Outline**

The registration assistance will be also available on Sunday (July 6) from 17:00 to 19:00

Monday 7th	Tuesday 8th	Wednesday 9th
8:00-8:45 Registration		
8:45-9:00 Opening Session	8:30-10:00 Parallel Sessions	8:30-10:00 Parallel Sessions
9:00-10:00 Plenary Session 1	10:00-10:30	10:00-10:30
10:00-11:00 Plenary Session 2	Coffee Break	Coffee Break
11:00-11:30	10:30-11:30 Plenary Session 3	10:30-11:30 Plenary Session 4
Coffee Break	11:30-12:00 Coffee Break	11:30-12:00 Coffee Break
11:30-13:00 Parallel Sessions	12:00-13:10 Parallel Sessions	12:00-13:10 Parallel Sessions
13:00-14:10 Lunch	13:10-14:30 Lunch	13:10-14:30 Lunch
14:10-15:20 Parallel Sessions 15:20-15:35 Coffee Break	14:30-16:00 Parallel Sessions	14:30-15:40 Parallel Sessions
15:35-16:45		15:40-16:00 Break 16:00-16:15
Parallel Sessions		Closing Session
16:45-17:30 SING Representatives Council		16:15-17:15 SING Assembly
18:30-19:30 Old Town Tour	17:00-22:00 "Wieliczka Salt Mine" Tour	40.00
19:30-22:00 Welcome Reception at "Collegium Maius"	and Dinner	19:00 Gala Dinner at the "Palace under the Rams" (Piwnica pod Baranami)




Monday 7th					
8:00-8:45	Registration				
8:45-9:00	45-9:00 Opening session (Aula DO)				
9:00-10:00	9:00-10:00 Plenary session 1 (Aula DO), ANDRZEJ NOWAK: Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Growth Economies, Chairman: Jacek Mercik				
10:00-11:0	O Plenary session Chairman: Jacek		O GAMBARELLI: <b>Some</b>	Open Problems in Coop	erative Games,
11:00-11:30	Coffee Break (Ha	all)			
Parallel sessions	Dynamic Networks and Cooperative Games I	Monopoly and Oligopoly games	Nash equilibrium	Games with externalities	Signaling and Cheap Talk
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
11:30- 13:00	<u>László Kóczy</u> : A risk- based core	Mingli Zheng and Chong Wang: Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity	Anna Zseleva, Dries Vermeulen and János Flesch: Modeling games with finitely additive probabilities	Oskar Skibski, Tomasz Michalak and Michael Wooldridge: Reconsidering the Shapley value in games with externalities	Lars Metzger: Contests with forced coalitions and incomplete information
	Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal and Eric Rémila: A decomposition of the space of TU- games using addition and transfer invariance	Agnieszka Wiszniewska- Matyszkiel, Marek Bodnar and Fryderyk Mirota: Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices – off-steady- state analysis	Mark Van Lokeren: Nash equilibria in a Downsian competition with costs	Joss Erick Sánchez- Pérez: A class of solutions for games with externalities generalizing the Shapley value	Andrzej Paliński: A game-theoretic approach to bank loan repayment
	Alexandre Skoda: Convexity of restricted games induced by arbitrary partitions	Matteo Foschi: Asymmetric information, commitment and self- control	Bartłomiej Kubica and Adam Woźniak: Interval methods for computing strong Nash equilibria of continuous games	Sylvain Ferrières and Frank Huettner: Linear anonymous solutions for cooperative games with externalities	Jonas Hedlund: Persuasion with communication costs
	Gilles Grandjean, Wouter Vergote and Daniela Tellone: Cooperation, competition and market entry	Andrea Di Liddo: Competition in a luxury market in the presence of counterfeiters	Dieter Balkenborg and <u>Dries</u> <u>Vermeulen</u> : Parametrization of the Nash correspondence	Helga Habis and Jens Gudmundsson: Assignment games with externalities	Margaret Meyer, Inés Moreno de Barreda and Julia Nafziger: Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
13:00-14:1	D Lunch (Hall)				





## Monday 7th continued

Parallel sessions	Dynamic Networks and Cooperative Games II	Duopoly, Hotelling	Equilibria I	Learning and Experimentation	Assignment games I
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
14:10- 15:20	Julia Belau: Consequences of connection failure - centrality and the importance for cohesion	Michał Ramsza: The Bertrand duopoly with bounded-rational consumers and explicitly modeled demand	Łukasz Balbus, Paweł Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett and <u>Łukasz</u> <u>Woźny</u> : Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities	Johannes Hörner, Nicolas Klein and Sven Rady: Strongly symmetric equilibria in bandit games	Francisco Robles Jiménez and Marina Núñez: One-seller assignment markets with multiple demands: a strategic implementation of the buyers-optimal core allocation
	Noemí Navarro: Forward-looking pairwise stability in networks with externalities across components	Michael Kramm and Maximilian Conze: The recommendation effect in the Hotelling game - a new result for an old model	Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn and <u>Marco</u> <u>Slikker</u> : Price of anarchy in sequencing situations and the impossibility to coordinate	Gulseren Mutlu: Learning under incentives	Péter Wojuteczky: Stable fixtures problem with payments
	Jan-Peter Siedlarek and Anja Prummer: Opinion leaders in influence networks and the integration of immigrant communities	Rainer Berkemer: Sampling dynamics applied to Hotelling location games with three or more players	Yigal Gerchak and Marc Kilgour: Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design		Christian Trudeau: Assignment, communication graph, stability and non-manipulability





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Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Values I	Public good	Equilibria II	Experiments/Experime ntal Game theory	Assignment games II		
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL		
15:35- 16:45	André Casajus and Frank Huettner: Weak monotonicity, proportional taxation, and the egalitarian Shapley values	Toshiyuki Hirai: Stable sets of a strategic public good provision game	Takahiro Watanabe: Existence of Pure Strategy equilibrium in finite games and direction preservingness of best reply functions	Jesper Breinbjerg, Lars Peter Østerdal and Alexander Sebald: Strategic behavior and social outcomes in bottlenecks: Experimental evidence	Ata Atay and Marina Núñez: Three-sided assignment games: core stability and undominated allocations		
	Julio Macias-Ponce and William Olvera-Lopez: A characterization of a solution based on prices for a discrete cost sharing problem	Alfonso Rosa-Garcia and Alejandro Rosa- Galvez: Private provision of a public good: cooperation and altruism of internet forum users	Stewart Ethier and Jiyeon Lee: A game- theoretic analysis of baccara banque	Dominique Chariot: Trust and sequential reciprocity	<u>Dezső Bednay</u> : vNM stable sets in Böhm- Bawerk horse markets		
	Leon Petrosyan: Cooperative games with perfect information	Sławomir Plaskacz and Joanna Zwierzchowska: A Smale type strategies for the 3- player "public goods" game		Katja Nottbohm and Ivica Rogina: Trustworthiness of people in negotiations and their visual impressions	Javier Martínez-De-Albéniz, Carlos Rafels and Neus Ybern: The nucleolus of the assignment game: a simple procedure and a rule		
16:45-17:3	16:45-17:30 SING Representatives Council (Room LA)						
18:30-19:3	Old Town Tour						
19:30-22:0	19:30-22:00 Welcome Reception at "Collegium Maius"						






Tuesday 8	3th				
Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Solutions	Models of interaction in Game Theory I	Solutions for games with coalitional structure	Voting I	Auctions
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
8:30- 10:00	<u>Ilya Katsev</u> : The nucleolus for additive games with hierarchy	M. Josunse Albizuri and <u>Peter Sudhölter</u> : Axiomatizations of the core of games with communication structures	Maria Albina Puente and José Miguel Giménez: Modified multilinear extensions for generalized mixed semivalues	Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron and Arkadii Slinko: Properties of multiwinner voting rules	Gyula Seres: Sequential bargaining with delay
	Natalia Naumova: Generalized nucleolus, kernels, and bargaining sets for cooperative games with restricted cooperation	Sylvain Beal, Anna Khmelnitskaya and Philippe Solal: Two- step values for games with two-level communication structures	Maria Ekes: Some remarks on generalized Owen index in simple games with externalities	Julio González-Díaz, Florian Herold and Diego Domínguez: Endogenous sequential voting	Ella Segev and Aner Sela: Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions
	Ana Meca and Greys Sosic: On supremum BBCM games	Frank Steffen: Positional power in the institutional setting of the European Union	Inés Gallego Sánchez, Julio Fernández García, Andrés Jiménez Losada and Manuel Ordóñez Sánchez: Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation	Hannu Nurmi: Are we done with preference rankings?	Arieh Gavious and Yizhaq Minchuk: Revenue in contests with many participants
	Tibor Németh and Miklós Pintér: The WS core of a TUU game as the core of an NTU game	Encarnación Algaba, René van Den Brink and Chris Dietz: Characterization of the hierarchical power on network structures	Gleb Koshevoy, Takamasa Suzuki and Dolf Talman: Solutions for games with general coalitional structure		Yuan Ju, Youngsub Chun and Rene van den Brink: Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts
10:00-10:30	Coffee Break (H	all)			
10:30-11:30	•	3 (Aula DO), ARIEL RUBIN	•		
11:30-12:00	Coffee Break (H	all)			





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Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Values II	Models of interaction in Game Theory II	Social networks	Voting and Power Indices I	Bargaining I
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
12:00- 13:10	Enrique González- Arangüena, Conrado Manuel and Mónica Del Pozo: Values of games with weighted graphs	Ulrich Faigle and Michel Grabisch: Linear transforms, bases and least square approximation for cooperation systems	Hubert János Kiss and Alfonso Rosa- García: On the mobilizing role of social media in revolutions: A game- theoretic approach	José Manuel Gallardo Morilla, Nieves Jiménez Jiménez and Andrés Jiménez Losada: Power indices for authorization structures	Nadia Mâagli and Marco Licalzi: Bargaining over a common conceptual space
	Francisco Sanchez Sanchez and Luis Hernández- Lamoneda: Cooperative games with homogeneous groups of participants	Agnieszka Rusinowska, Jean-François Caulier and Michel Grabisch: An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes	Mitri Kitti: Axioms for centrality scoring with principal eigenvectors	Stefano Moretti: Coalitional games for abstract argumentation	Ahmet Özkardaş and Agnieszka Rusinowska: On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time
	Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano and Francisco López-Navarrete: How to allocate revenues in an Internet TV system? A game theoretical answer	Irinel Dragan: On the coalitional rationality of the Shapley value and other efficient values		Federica Briata, Marco Dall'Aglio and Vito Fragnelli: Power indices measuring collusion in the Knaster's procedure	Daniel Cardona and Antoni Rubí-Barceló: Investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities





Tuesd		

Parallel sessions	Cooperative games	Evolutionary games and prisoner's dilemma	Bankruptcy game	Voting II	Bargaining II
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
14:30- 16:00	Estela Sánchez- Rodríguez, Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo and Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo: On the others monotonicity properties of airport games	Guilhem Lecouteux: The evolutionary stability of payoff- maximising behaviour	Jiawen Li and Yuan Ju: A non- cooperative approach to the Talmud solution for the bankruptcy problems	Honorata Sosnowska: Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation	Daniel Cardona and Antoni Rubí-Barceló: On the Efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
	Trine Tornøe Platz: On games arising from multi-depot traveling salesman problems	Adam Pigoń: Evolutionary macroeconomics	Estela Sánchez- Rodríguez, <u>Miguel</u> <u>Ángel Mirás Calvo</u> and Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo: On the core-center of bankruptcy games	Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons: What is essential in measuring power and what is not?	Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska: The Common agricultural policy reforms under the WTO pressure-game theoretical approach
	Gabriel Turbay: Moves of the third kind: The strategic nature of cooperative games	Robert Golański: Prevalence of cooperative strategies in evolutionary repeated prisoner's dilemma	M. Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro, José María Alonso-Meijide and Mikel Álvarez- Mozos: Efficient Banzhaf values based on bankruptcy rules	Imma Curiel: A multifaceted analysis of the electoral system of the Republic of Suriname	Rod Garratt and Marek Pycia: Efficient bilateral trade
		Andrzej Wieczorek: Extension of the definition of prisoners' dilemma to games with arbitrarily many players and strategies	Natividad Llorca, Elisabeth Gutiérrez, Manuel A. Mosquera and Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano: Bankruptcy techniques for solving linear production situations with a common-pool resource	Jacek Mercik: When minority beats majority: the case of Augustus II the Strong – the King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth	

17:00-22:00


"Wieliczka Salt Mine" Tour and Dinner





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Parallel sessions	Allocation	Extensive and Strategic games	Market models	Mechanism design
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA
8:30- 10:00	Marco Dall'Aglio, <u>Camilla</u> <u>Di Luca</u> and Lucia Milone: Maxmin allocation of homogeneous goods: the three players case	Mamoru Kaneko and Shuige Liu: Eliminations of dominated strategies and inessential players: an abstraction process	Joanna Syrda: Music industry concentration and product variety	Ville Korpela: The revelation principle in retrospect: Some observations on the multiple equilibrium problem
	Pere Timoner and Josep Maria Izquierdo: Rationing problems with payoff-thresholds	Ludmila Novac: Approach of the loss risk for the problem of currency exchange	Zbigniew Świtalski: A characterization of the set of equilibrium price vectors in the Gale-Shapley market model	Volker Britz and Hans Gersbach: Democratic mechanisms with experimentation
	Frank Huettner and Dominik Karos: An allocation rule for liability situations with multiple tortfeasors	Dmitriy Kvasov and John Hillas: Backward induction in games without perfect recall	Chih Chang: Unawareness and the standard state- space models	Lars Ehlers, Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach
	Yusuke Kamishiro: On the core of a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information	<u>Igal Milchtaich</u> : Polyequilibrium	Fernando Bernstein and Víctor Martínez de Albéniz: Using product rotation to induce purchases from strategic consumers	
10:00-10:3	Coffee Break (Hall)			
10:30-11:3		la DO), GERARD VAN DER LAA Chairman: Vito Fragnelli	N, Cooperative Decision Ma	aking in Water
11:30-12:0	OO Coffee Break (Hall)			





Wednesday 9th continued				
Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Shapley value	Allocation and Networks	TU games I	Voting and Power Indices II
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA
12:00-	Koji Yokote: Consistent weighted Shapley values and the core in NTU games	Gustavo Bergantiños, Julio González-Díaz, <u>Ángel</u> <u>Manuel González-Rueda</u> and María Pérez-Fernández de Córdoba: Allocating gas losses in gas transport networks	Stéphane Gonzalez and Michel Grabisch: Autonomous coalitions	Magdalena Adamus: Hugo Steinhaus' early contributions to the game theory
	Ramón Flores, Elisenda Molina and Juan Tejada: The Shapley group value	Eliane Lambertz: Cost allocation in generalized Steiner tree games	Eric Bahel: On the core and bargaining set of a veto game	Cesarino Bertini, <u>Izabella</u> <u>Stach</u> : On Public values and power indices
	Yukihiko Funaki and Koji Yokote: Several bases of a game space and an application to the Shapley value	Péter Csóka: Risk capital allocation in networks	Jesús Getán, <u>Jesús</u> <u>Montes</u> and Carles Rafels: PMAS and Lorenz-PMAS in coalitional games	Marcin Malawski: Voting games with some "large" and many "small" players: limit behaviour of some power indices
13:10-14:3	0 Lunch (Hall)			
Parallel sessions	Cooperative games and Networks	Decision making and Simulations	TU games II	
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA
14:30- 15:40	Radim Valenčik and Ondrej Cernik: Analysis of social networks with usage of modified Raiffa solution for cooperative games	Alexandru W. Popp: Optimizing game theoretical simulations	Francesc Llerena and Llúcia Mauri: On reduced games and the lexmax solution	
	<u>Dávid Csercsik</u> : Cooperation in traffic routing games on scale free wireless networks	<u>Dieter Balkenborg</u> : Rationalizability and logical inference	Yasushi Agatsuma, Yukihiko Funaki and Koji Yokote: Random reduction consistency of Weber set and the core	
	Martha Saboya, Guillermo Owen and Susana López: Reliability of communication networks	Vito Fragnelli, Montserrat Pons, Josep Freixas and Lluis Sanmiquel: Some measures to evaluate the importance of factors contributing in a process	Elena Yanovskaya: Self- covariant solutions to cooperative games with transferable utilities	
15:40-16:0	00 Break			
16:00-16:15 Closing Session (Aula DO)				
16:15-17:1	.5 SING Assembly (Aula	DO)		
19:00	Gala Dinner at "Palac	e under the Rams" (Pałac pod	Baranami)	